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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB) decision has
focused much attention on the impact of the National Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter NLRA),1 in the non-union context. The NLRB’s decision in the matter
of Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio2 (hereinafter Epilepsy) overturned its
fifteen year old precedent and extended N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc.3 (hereinafter
Weingarten) rights to employees in the non-union setting. This right allows an
employee to have a co-worker representative present during investigatory interviews
with the employer. Management attorneys read the opinion with disbelief and fear
of the effect that this decision would have on their non-union, employer clients. The
irony of the situation is that the decision to extend Weingarten rights to non-union
employees was grounded in the NLRA, which has had such little impact in the nonunion setting that those who are most affected by this decision are completely
unaware of the Act on which the decision was based.4

1

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).

2

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 (2000).

3

The term Weingarten rights comes from the Supreme Court decision that established the
right, N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. (1975).
4

See John D. Canoni, Non-Union Employees are Entitled to Have a Coworker Present at
Investigatory Interviews, NIXON PEABODY LLP PUBLICATIONS (July 18, 2000), at
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_new_fulltext.asp?ID=722&BACK=attorneys_ne
w_bio.asp?ID=598; Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., NLRB Makes Sweeping Changes for Nonunion
Employers, ARK. EMP. LAW LETTER, Sept. 2000, at 1; Susan J. McGolrick, Attorneys Disagree
About the Wisdom of NLRB Extending Weingarten Rights, DAILY LABOR REPORT, August 7,
2000, at 1-2.
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Passed in response to the nineteenth century hostility towards union activity, the
NLRA traditionally was viewed as a pro-union statute.5 However, as much as the
Act contains provisions clearly aimed at protecting union activity, the Act explicitly
applies to non-union employees as well as union employees.6 Nevertheless, many
nonunion employers and employees are unaware of the existence of the NLRA
despite it being the only law governing the relationship between an employer and its
employees as a group in most private sector establishments in this country.7 This
ignorance places non-union employers in an especially precarious position given the
recent Epilepsy8 decision by National Labor Relations Board,9 which was upheld by
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.10
This Note analyzes the conflicting history surrounding this issue and asserts that
the necessary pre-requisites of section 7 (hereinafter § 7) of the NLRA are not
satisfied when the Weingarten right is extended to the nonunion setting. The Note
will begin the discussion with an analysis of Weingarten, the Supreme Court case
that established Weingarten rights in the union setting.11 Next, the competing NLRB
decisions regarding whether Weingarten should be extended to the nonunion setting
will be set forth. Having set the stage, the discussion will turn to the definition of
protected concerted activity within the meaning of the NLRA, specifically within the
meaning of § 7 of the NLRA. The Note will then argue that the essential elements of
concertedness and the mutuality are not met when only one employee in the
nonunion setting is acting in relation to the employer during an investigatory
meeting. As a result, this Note concludes that the Board erroneously grounded its
Epilepsy decision on the practical consequences of its decision rather than a
sufficient showing of concerted activity and mutuality when one nonunion employee,
involved in an investigatory meeting with the employer, seeks the aid of a fellow
employee.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S WEINGARTEN DECISION
The right of employees to have a representative present during an investigatory
meeting arose when the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s establishment of such a
right in Weingarten.12 The case began with an in-house investigation of one of the

5

American Hospital Association v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The statute,
though otherwise nondirective, can be read to suggest that the tilt should be in favor of unions
. . . the principal purpose of the Act was and is to protect workers who want to organize for
collective bargaining.”).
6

Wilson Trophy Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502, 1508 (8th Cir. 1993).

7

Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1675-76 (1989).
8

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 NLRB LEXIS at 428.

9

Oral arguments were scheduled for October 2, 2001 before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit.
10

See Epliepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

11

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 251.

12

Id.
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employer’s workers regarding the suspected theft of food from the employer.13 The
employer conducted an interview and multiple times throughout the interview, the
employee asked the manager for her union shop steward or some other union
representative to be called to the interview.14 Her requests were denied and during
the course of the interview, the employee explained why it appeared as though she
was stealing food from the company while in fact she was not.15 Although the
employee was not found to be stealing, the employee implicated herself for eating
“free lunches” while at work.16
Accordingly, the store manager closely interrogated the employee about these
apparent violations of store policy.17 The employee again asked that her shop
steward be called to the interview and again, her request was denied.18 Based on the
interview, a written statement, which included a computation of $160 for the
employee to pay back to the company, was drafted.19 The employee refused to sign
the statement and after detailing the incident to her shop steward, filed an unfair
labor practice (hereinafter “ULP”) charge with the NLRB.20
The Board held, consistent with its prior decisions,21 that the employer’s denial of
the employee’s request for union representation at the investigatory meeting
constituted a ULP under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because it interfered with the
employee’s § 7 right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.22
It is important to note that as much as the Weingarten Board affirmed its prior
construction of § 7, which created the right for a union employee to request and
obtain representation at certain investigatory interviews, it also affirmed the
limitations that prior Board decisions placed on such a right.23 First, the employee
must request the representation; and an employer does not have an obligation to

13

Id. at 251.

14

Id. at 254.

15

Id. at 254-55.

16

Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 254-55.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 255.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 256.

21

The Board first announced that its construction of § 7 “creates a statutory right in an
employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he
reasonably fears may result in his discipline” in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198-99
(1972). Accordingly, the Board held that when an employer denies this request, it is
committing an 8(a)(1) violation. Id. at 199. Section 8(a)(1) states: “It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
22

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 251.

23

J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449 (1973) (noting that the Board was applying
the principles enunciated in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972) and Mobil Oil Corp.,
196 N.L.R.B. 144 (1972).
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inform the employee of this right.24 Second, this right is only triggered in situations
where the employee reasonably believes that the investigation will result in
disciplinary action.25 Third, an employer can refuse the request without any
justification or explanation.26 However, if the employee refuses to submit to an
interview without representation, the employer must cancel the interview because it
cannot force the employee to participate in the interview without representation.27
Fourth, the employer does not have to bargain with the representative attending the
investigatory interview.28
When the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision
that a violation of § 8(a)(1) resulted from the denial of the employee’s request for
union representation at an investigatory meeting, it refused to enforce the Board’s
cease and desist order.29 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.30 In upholding
the Board’s decision, the Supreme Court found that “the action of an employee in
seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confrontation with his
employer clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7 that ‘employees shall have the
right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.’”31
The court further found that when an employer interferes with an employee’s right to
request union representation at an investigatory interview, it is a violation of
§ 8(a)(1), which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in exercising the rights guaranteed in § 7.32
The Court very clearly stated the premises on which it was basing this right to
request assistance in such meetings. First, the Court stated that the union
representative safeguarded not only the interests of the employee being investigated,
but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit.33 Second, the Court found that the
24

See Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052.

25

See Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-199.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 260. ‘“The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to
clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have knowledge of them. The
employer, however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in hearing the
employee’s own account of the matter under investigation.”’ Id. (citing the Brief for
Petitioner at 22, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975)).
29
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Company’s reliance on “a long line of Board
decisions, each which indicates – either directly or indirectly – that no union representative
need be present [at an investigatory interview].” NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135,
1137 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 138 (1971); Texaco,
Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); Wald Manufacturing Co., 176
N.L.R.B. 839 (1970); aff’d, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographic Service, Inc.,
176 N.L.R.B. 359 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 84 (1968); Chevron Oil
Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967); Dobbs House, Inc., 145 H.L.R.B. 1565 (1964)).
30

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 251.

31

Id. at 260 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973)).

32

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).

33

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260.
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representative’s presence assured other employees that they could also seek
representation if called upon to attend a like interview.34 The Court went on to lay
out two more justifications for upholding the Board’s decision. First, the Court
found the Board’s construction to “plainly effectuate the most fundamental purposes
of the Act.”35 Second, the Court found the Board’s construction to give recognition
to the right when it is most useful to both employee and employer on account of the
expertise of the union representative.36 Namely, the union representative’s presence
may help bring about resolution of the problem at the investigatory stage and prevent
the filing of a grievance.
After laying out these justifications, the Court so clearly established what has
been named the Weingarten right for union employees that it has survived unscathed
for almost thirty years. However, the Court did not address the issue of whether the
right was also present in the nonunion setting.37
III. COMPETING DECISIONS OF THE NLRB AS TO WHETHER WEINGARTEN
SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE NON-UNION SETTING
In the years following Weingarten, the Board has not been consistent in its
determination as to whether the Weingarten right should be extended to the nonunion
setting. Seven years after Weingarten, in the case of Materials Research Corp.
(hereinafter Materials Research),38 the Board concluded that the Court’s Weingarten
opinion did not call for a restrictive interpretation of § 7 and it extended the right to
representation during an investigatory meeting to the nonunion setting.39 When
Materials Research was decided, the Board was composed of three Carter appointees
and two Reagan appointees.40 The three Carter hold-overs voted in favor of
extending Weingarten, while the two Reagan appointees dissented from the opinion.
The majority members’ analysis of whether a nonunion employee is entitled to
the Weingarten right began with the premise that the right “emanates from the
employee’s rights guaranteed by Section 7”41 as opposed to the union’s rights
34

Id. at 261.

35

Id. “Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably
believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was
designed to eliminate.” Id. at 262.
36

Id. “A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting
favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident
occasioning the interview.” J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 263.
37

“This case left many questions unanswered, one of which was whether section 7 affords
unorganized employees the same representational right enjoyed by their union counterparts.”
Jill D. Flack, Limiting the Weingarten Right in the Nonunion Setting: The Implications of
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1986).
38

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).

39

Id. at *13, *18.

40

See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000) (appendix).
41

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *7.
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guaranteed by Section 9 (hereinafter § 9).42 Citing the limitations that the Court
placed on the role of the Weingarten representative,43 the majority noted that the
representative could not possibly be acting in a collective-bargaining capacity during
such a meeting, and § 9 is only triggered in a collective bargaining scenario.44
Accordingly, the majority concluded that there can be no doubt that the Court
protected the Weingarten right under § 7 as opposed to § 9.
After concluding that the Court did not protect the Weingarten right as one
belonging to the union under § 9, the majority in Materials Research addressed why
it appeared as though the Court placed much stock in the role of the union
representative in its analysis. The majority noted that the Court found the employee
seeking assistance to have an immediate stake in the outcome of the interview, while
the union representative had broader purposes that went beyond the immediate
concern of the individual employee.45 These broader purposes were: (1) safeguarding
the interests of all the employees in the bargaining unit and (2) reassuring all
employees in the bargaining unit that if they were to be subjected to a similar
interview, they also could seek the assistance of a representative.46
The Materials Research majority seemed to accept that these functions of the
representative were central to the finding of § 7 protected activity in Weingarten.
However, the majority contended that these functions did not belong exclusively to
union representatives.47 While recognizing that the Court framed its discussion in
terms of the role of a “union representative,” the majority found such language to
merely be a reflection of the facts of the case: “that terminology…was utilized
because it accurately depicted the specific fact pattern presented . . . not because the
Court intended to limit the right recognized in Weingarten only to unionized
employees.”48 Thus, the majority endorsed a broad interpretation of the Court’s use
of “union representative” so as to include a nonunion, co-worker representatives.

42

Section 9 of the Act states: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
43

Specifically, the majority referred to how “the Court carefully differentiated [between]
the role assigned to a representative at an investigatory interview from that of a collectivebargaining representative acting in its representative capacity.” Materials Research Corp.,
262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *11. The majority noted three particular limitations that the Court
placed on the Weingarten representative that distinguish him from a collective bargaining
representative: (1) the Weingarten representative is simply to act as an assistant in clarifying
facts; (2) the employer can cancel the meeting altogether and (3) the employer is under no
duty to bargain with the representative during the meeting. Id.
44

Id. at *11.

45

Id. at *7.

46

Id. at *7-8.

47

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *22-23.

48

Id. at *9.
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In a similar vein, the Materials Research majority went on to note that the
protection afforded under § 7, does not vary between union and nonunion settings.49
The majority seemed to place far more weight in the fact that the Court grounded the
right in § 7 rather than in the fact that the Court focused on “union representation.”
In other words, the majority seemed to ask how the Court could have intended to
limit its Weingarten decision to a union setting if it based that decision on a
provision that is equally applicable in a nonunion setting.50
The majority then discussed the fundamental purposes of the NLRA: the
elimination of the inequality in bargaining power between employers and
employees.51 The majority held that requiring a lone employee to attend an
investigatory interview that may lead to discipline perpetuates the inequality that the
Act was designed to eliminate.52 Furthermore, the majority found that the inequality
of such a scenario is magnified in the nonunion setting because nonunion employees
do not have either a collective bargaining agreement or a grievance arbitration
procedure, which provide a set of checks and balances on the employer.53 Thus, the
majority asserted that the concern of the Court in Weingarten to give union
employees “some measure of protection against unjust employer practices”54 should
be just as great, if not greater, in a nonunion setting.
The Materials Research majority concluded its analysis by discussing how a coworker representative, in comparison to a union representative, could just as easily
effectuate the underlying purpose of Weingarten to “prevent an employer from
overpowering a lone employee.”55 The majority asserted that the Court so limited the
actions of a Weingarten representative that any co-worker representative could
satisfy the role.56
The overall scheme of the majority’s argument seems to be that: (1) the Court
established the Weingarten right under § 7, which is equally applicable in the
nonunion setting as the union setting; (2) the inequalities that the Court was
concerned with minimizing by means of the Weingarten right are all the more severe
in the nonunion setting, and (3) the contours of the role of the Weingarten
representative are such that a co-worker representative could just as easily fulfill the
role as a union representative.
Chairman Van De Water took issue with several of the majority’s arguments and
dissented from the majority’s decision to extend the Weingarten right to nonunion
setting.57 Similar to the majority, Van De Water began his opinion with an analysis
49

Id. at *13.

50

“While the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the presence of a union
representative, it must be assumed that the § 7 right today recognized ... also exists in the
absence of a recognized union.” Id. at *13-14 (citing Powell’s dissent in Weingarten).
51

Id. at *19.

52

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *19.

53

Id. at *19-20.

54

Id. at *20.

55

Id. at *21.

56

Id. at *22-23.

57

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *28.
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of the interaction between § 7 and § 9. Starting with the premise that the Weingarten
right must be consistent with all of the provisions of the Act, Van De Water found
that an extension to the nonunion setting would be inconsistent with § 9. 58 Noting
that § 9 only requires an employer to deal with duly elected representatives,59 Van De
Water concluded that “in the absence of a recognized or certified union, an employer
is free to deal with its employees individually.”60 In direct contrast to the majority’s
contention that the Weingarten right was one protecting concerted activity, Van De
Water viewed the right as one preventing an employer from interfering with an
employee’s right to representation by a duly chosen agent.61 The right that Van De
Water spoke of could not, therefore, be present in the nonunion setting because there
is no duly chosen agent in that setting.
Van De Water went on to state that not only was the majority giving nonunion
employees powers that should be reserved for union representatives, but it was also
doing so without imposing the limits and obligations of the Act that bind union
representatives.62 Specifically, the nonunion representative has the power to make
suggestions regarding the investigation and forms of discipline, which Van De Water
likened to the activities of a labor organization.63 However, the representative is not
at the same time subject to the statutory checks on unions, such as the duty of fair
representation.64
Van De Water next attacked the majority for setting the investigatory interview
apart from other employer/employee confrontations surrounding terms and
conditions of employment by only extending the right to representation to the
investigatory interview.65 Van De Water posited that the result of an employer’s
discussion with an employee regarding pay scale, safety matters, or work hours
might have more of an impact on the employee than the result of a disciplinary
interview, yet the employee has no right to a co-worker representative at such
meetings.66 Although Van De Water found no logical distinction between the
58

Id. at *29 (Van De Water, dissenting). Section 9(a) states: “Representatives designated
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit.” 29 U.S.C. §159 (1994).
59
Section 9(a) of the Act does not specifically state that a nonunion employer can deal
with employees individually, but the section only imposes an obligation to deal with the
employees via representatives in a union setting. Therefore, the accepted inference is that
nonunion employers can deal with employees individually.
60

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *29 (Van De Water, dissenting).

61

Id. at *34 n.36 (Van De Water, dissenting).

62

Id. at *41 (Van De Water, dissenting).

63

Id. at *40 (Van De Water, dissenting).

64

Id. at *41 (Van De Water, dissenting). Implicitly, Van De Water was arguing that a
“hybrid” representative was created in the sense that the representative is not given labor
organization status. Thus, without that status, the representative is not subject to the
limitations of §8(b), yet has many of the powers/abilities of a labor organization.
65

Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *41-42 (Van De Water, dissenting).

66

Id.
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investigatory interview and these other “confrontations” in the sense that they all
affect the terms and conditions of employment, he hypothesized that the majority of
the Materials Research Board would not extend the right to representation to these
other settings.67
Finally, attacking another premise of the majority, Van De Water claimed that
there is indeed a distinction between § 7 protection in union and nonunion settings
because the presence or absence of a union will determine the extent of the
employee’s § 7 rights.68 Van De Water clarified this statement by explaining that
many of the § 7 rights, such as the right to bargain collectively and insist upon a
written collective bargaining agreement, only become “operational” with the
presence of a union.69 Van De Water did not assert that union and nonunion
employees have different § 7 protections as a matter of fact, but, rather, that some are
operational only in the union context due to the status of a recognized bargaining
representative.70
Member Hunter, the other dissenting member, wrote a very concise opinion
consisting of two arguments against the extension of the Weingarten right. First, he
relied on the Court’s characterization of the unique role of the union representative to
protect the interests of the whole bargaining unit and to assure the other employees
that they too could obtain assistance if called upon to attend a similar interview.71
Based on this characterization of the representative, Hunter found that although the
employer is under no obligation to bargain with the representative, the Weingarten
right “flows from the status of the union as collective-bargaining representative.”72 In
the absence of a union, Hunter found that the Court’s justification for the Weingarten
right was lacking because there is no parallel obligation in the nonunion setting to
protect the interests of all employees.73
Second, he set forth practical reasons for opposing the majority’s decision: (1)
the nonunion employer will be confronted with a “representative” who lacks the
skills, responsibilities, and knowledge possessed by union stewards; (2) the
representative may be emotionally involved in the interview, and (3) “Pandora’s
Box” will be opened.74
67

Id. at *42.

68

Id. at *43 (Van De Water, dissenting).

69

Id. *43-44 (Van De Water, dissenting).

70

“Although such rights [as the right to collective bargaining and the right to demand a
collective bargaining agreement] exist within the framework of section 7, the presence of a
union is required to make the rights operational.” Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B.
1010 at *43-44.
71

Id. at *50 (Hunter, dissenting).

72

Id.

73

Id.

74
Id. at *51-52. Hunter’s claim that extending Weingarten would open “Pandora’s Box”
came out of his observation that the Weingarten right, even in the confines of the union
setting, had already caused so many struggles for the Board. These struggles arose out of what
Hunter characterized as “expansionist Board decisions” that interpreted Weingarten in a way
that transformed investigatory interviews into adversary proceedings. Hunter found this to be
a result that the Court “clearly wished to avoid” and he determined that extending the right to
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Only three years after Materials Research, the dissenting opinion of Van De
Water became the majority opinion when a 3-member Board, consisting solely of
Reagan appointees,75 overturned itself and revoked the extension of Weingarten in
the case of Sears, Roebuck and Co. (hereinafter Sears).76 No members from the
Materials Research majority participated in Sears, and Hunter, who dissented in
Materials Research, wrote a concurring opinion.
Sears, not only reversed Materials Research, but also insisted that confining
Weingarten to the union setting is compelled by the Act.77 Put another way, the
Sears Board claimed that the Act forbids extending the Weingarten right to the
nonunion setting. Although the majority opinion in Sears claimed to be adopting
Chairman Van de Water’s dissenting opinion in Materials Research,78 it should be
noted that Van De Water never claimed that the Act compelled the conclusion that
Weingarten could not be extended to the nonunion setting.
The Sears Board began its analysis by endorsing the Court’s Weingarten decision
as “wholly consistent with established principles of labor management relations.”79
Specifically, the majority noted that under § 9 of the Act, a certified union is vested
with exclusive representation of the employees within the bargaining unit such that
whenever a union employer wishes to take action that would affect the terms and
conditions of employment, it must recognize the employees’ right to representation.80
Because an investigatory interview is such an occasion that may result in a change in
the terms and conditions of employment, “the application of Weingarten in a union
setting meshes comfortably with established concepts governing dealings among
employees, management, and unions.”81
Although the Board did not go so far as to claim that the Weingarten right grew
out of or resulted from § 9, it found that the Weingarten right was consistent with § 9
when applied in the union setting.82 On the other hand, the Board found that when
the Weingarten right is applied in the nonunion setting, it “wrecks havoc with
fundamental provisions of the Act.”83 Just as clearly as an employer of a unionized

the nonunion setting would only result in more complications that the Court would have
wished to avoid. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *51-52. (Hunter,
dissenting).
75
The Sears, Roebuck Board consisted of Chairman Donald Dotson, Member Patricia Diaz
Dennis and Member Robert P. Hunter.
76

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).

77

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *3 n.5.

78

Id. at *3.

79

Id. at *5.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *5.

83

Id. at *5.
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workforce cannot usually deal with the employees individually, an employer of a
nonunionized workforce is totally free to deal with the employees individually.84
This argument by the Board in Sears brings out more clearly Van De Water’s
argument that extending Weingarten to the nonunion setting exalts the interview
setting above other employer/employee encounters. The Sears Board stated this
most clearly with the following language: “when the Board held in Materials
Research Corp. that Weingarten rights are applicable in a nonunion setting, it told
employers, in effect, that they have the right to act on an individual basis with
respect to an employee’s terms and conditions of employment except for the conduct
of an investigatory interview.”85
The Sears Board then refused to accept the “rationalizations” of the Materials
Research majority as to why a nonunion employer can be required to deal with a
Weingarten representative. They identified these rationalizations as: (1) the
Weingarten decision is based on § 7, which extends its protections to represented and
unrepresented employees alike and (2) the Weingarten representative is not cloaked
with full collective-bargaining authority.86
The Board rejected the first rationalization by asserting that “[t]he scope of § 7’s
protection may vary depending on whether employees are represented or
unrepresented, and the § 7 rights of one group cannot be mechanically transplanted
to the other group at the expense of important statutory policies.”87 In order to
illustrate this argument, the Sears Board relied on Van De Water’s discussion of
Emporium Capwell Co.,88 a case in which unionized employees engaged in picketing
as an attempt to persuade the employer to deal with them directly rather than through
their union representatives.89 The Supreme Court did not find the employees’ actions
to be protected in that case because they contravened the exclusivity provisions of
§ 9, but Van De Water argued that if the same actions were undertaken by nonunion
employees, they would be protected.90 Accordingly, he asserted that § 7 protection
does vary between the union and nonunion setting.
The Sears Board rejected the second rationalization by asserting that although the
Weingarten representative cannot engage the employer in collective bargaining, the
representative is “dealing with” the employer in that it is acting on behalf of all
employees in the bargaining unit and is allowed to speak and present suggestions for
discipline. The Board then noted that “dealing with an employer is a primary
indicium of labor organization status as well as a traditional union function.”91 This
point then leads back to the majority’s conclusion that recognizing a Weingarten
84

Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974) (holding that an
employer generally does not have to recognize a representative of employees in the absence of
an election); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
85

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *6.

86

Id. at *7.

87

Id. at *8.

88

Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1974).

89

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *7.

90

Material Resource Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 at *45 (Van De Water, dissenting).

91

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *9.
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right in a nonunion setting wreaks havoc with the fundamental principles of the Act
because only in the union context is an employer required to deal with the
employees’ chosen representative.92
Member Hunter agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Weingarten should
not be extended to the nonunion setting, but he did not agree that such a conclusion
is compelled by the Act.93 Hunter offered a very organized opinion that walked
through the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision. First, he noted that the Supreme
Court limited its analysis simply to whether the Weingarten Board’s construction of
§ 7, in terms of it giving union employees the right to union representation at
investigatory meetings, was reasonable.94 Hunter went on to state that the majority in
Materials Research ignored the Court’s self-imposed limits on its decision when it
claimed that the rationale of Weingarten compelled the same construction of § 7
when analyzing a nonunion employee’s right to representation at an investigatory
meeting.95
Hunter then set forth why he found an extension of Weingarten to a nonunion
setting to be unreasonable: (1) the decision effectively gave representation to
employees who have chosen to not be represented;96 (2) non-union representatives
have neither the knowledge, skill, and experience that a union representative
possesses, nor the obligation to represent the interests of the entire bargaining unit;97
(3) allowing all co-workers to serve as Weingarten representatives creates an
unlimited pool of representatives who might be emotionally involved.98
The next case in the history of NLRB decisions regarding the Weingarten right
prior to Epilepsy is E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (hereinafter DuPont).
The DuPont decision resulted from a Third Circuit remand decision, Slaughter v.
NLRB,99 which analyzed the reasoning of Sears. The Third Circuit overturned Sears
construction of § 7 that prohibited the extension of Weingarten to nonunion
settings.100 The court held that it was unreasonable to assert that the Act must be
interpreted as confining the Weingarten right to the union setting, but, the court
agreed that § 7 could be interpreted as confining the Weingarten right to only union
settings: “Had the Board…concluded that § 7 should note be interpreted as extending
Weingarten rights to nonunion employees, that determination would be entitled to
deference.”101 Hence, the court remanded the case to the Board.
Based on this Third Circuit directive, the Board held on remand that, although the
Act does not totally foreclose the extension, Weingarten should not be extended to
92

Id. at *10.

93

Id. at *11 (Hunter, concurring).

94

Id. at *12 (Hunter, concurring).

95

Id. at *16-17 (Hunter, concurring).

96

Sears, Robuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 at *18 (Hunter, concurring).

97

Id. at *19-20 (Hunter, concurring).

98

Id. at *20-21 (Hunter, concurring).

99

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988).

100

Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120, 122 (1986).

101

Id. at 125.
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the nonunion setting. The Board’s decision in DuPont was heavily focused on
balancing the “interests of labor and management.”102 The Board concluded that the
balance struck by the Supreme Court in Weingarten rested on factors that either are
not present in the nonunion setting or are not as compelling in the nonunion
setting.103 First, the Board stated that in a nonunion setting, the employee
representative has no obligation to represent the interests of the entire unit, and thus,
“there is no guarantee that the interests of the employees as a group would be
safeguarded by the presence of a fellow employee at an investigatory interview.”104
Not only does the co-worker not have an obligation to safeguard the interests of all,
he may not even have the capability to do so. To begin with, the co-worker would
not have access to records of how other employees were disciplined.105 More
importantly, the employer enjoys the freedom to engage in an arbitrary practice of
unjust punishment because there is no collective bargaining agreement that defines
employee misconduct and the means of dealing with it.106
The Board also found that the Weingarten decision was based on the skill level of
the union representative in terms of eliciting facts and suggesting discipline. The
Board contended that the employee representative, in a nonunion setting, is less
likely to have skills equivalent to those of a union representative.107 The Board noted
that not only might the employee representative have no experience in dealing with
such a situation, but he might also be a friend of the employee he is “representing”
and thus be emotionally involved.
The DuPont Board drew another distinction between nonunion and union settings
that focused on the available forums for addressing grievances. The Board noted the
benefit that results from the union representative’s successful resolution of the
problem at the early stage of the investigatory interview: he prevents the filing of a
grievance.108 This benefit has no value in the nonunion setting where there usually is
no enforceable grievance procedure available to an employee. In short, there is no
efficiency in preventing something that could never have happened.
Finally, the Board stated that the consequences of an employer denying the
employee’s request for representation and canceling the interview will be more
detrimental in the nonunion setting.109 In the union setting, the employee’s chance to
be heard is not totally lost because if the investigatory interview is canceled and
discipline ensues, the grievance procedure can be initiated and the employee will be
heard in that forum. In the nonunion setting, there usually is no such grievance
procedure and if the employer cancels the investigatory interview, the employee may
never be heard. Thus, if extending the Weingarten right to the nonunion setting

102

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627 at *6.

103

Id. at *9.

104

Id. at *12.

105

Id. at *12-13.

106

Id. at *12.

107

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627 at *14.

108

Id. at *15.

109

Id. at *16.
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causes more interviews to be canceled, such an extension may actually harm the
employee according to the Board in DuPont.
IV. THE BOARD’S DECISION IN EPILEPSY FOUNDATION OF NORTHEAST OHIO
The NLRB’s 3-2 decision in Epilepsy overturned the twelve year precedent of
DuPont and once again extended Weingarten rights to more than 100 million
nonunion workers.110 The Epilepsy Board’s three Democratic appointees voted for
the extension while the two Republican appointees dissented from the decision.111
The NLRB’s ruling came out of a case that began in 1996 when an employee of
Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, Arnis Borgs, brought unfair labor practice
charges against his employer following his discharge.112 The events leading up the
discharge began with Borgs and a co-worker, Ashraful Hasan, writing a memo to
their supervisor, Rick Berger, stating that his supervision was no longer needed.113 A
copy of the memo written by Borgs and Hasan was directed to the company’s
Executive Director, Christine Loehrke.114 After getting word that Loehrke and
Berger were unhappy about the memo, Hasan and Borgs sent a second memo,
specifically addressed to Loehrke, that criticized Berger’s involvement in the project
and cited his inappropriate behavior as the basis for their assertion that his
supervision was no longer needed.115
Three days after receiving the second memo, Loehrke directed Borgs to meet
with Berger and her.116 Borgs asked Loehrke if he could meet with her alone
because he felt intimidated during a prior meeting with Loehrke and Berger.117 After
Loehrke denied this request, Borgs asked if Hasan could be present with him at this
meeting. Loehrke refused this request as well.118 After Borgs’ continued opposition
to meeting alone with Loehrke and Berger, Loehrke told Borgs to go home for the
day and report back the next morning.119 When Borgs returned the next morning, he
met with Loehrke and the company’s Director of Administration, Jim Wilson.
During this meeting, Loehrke told Borgs that his refusal to meet with Berger and her
constituted gross insubordination and Borgs was terminated.120
110

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428.

111

Flynn, supra note 40, at 1361.

112

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 428 at *3.

113

Id.

114

Id. at *3.

115

Id.

116

Id. at *4.

117

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *5. This prior
meeting occurred in December, 1995. During this prior meeting, Borgs was “interrogated
about his discussions about salary information with other employees” and he was reprimanded
for such behavior. Id. at *5 n.5.
118

Id. at *5.

119

Id.

120

Id. at *5-6. The termination letter made reference to several other issues, including: (1)
the January 17 memo; (2) a failure to build constructive employment relationships with
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Borgs filed an unfair labor practice charge against Epilepsy, alleging several
§ 8(a)(1) violations surrounding his discharge.121 The Administrative Law Judge
(hereinafter ALJ) found that Borgs was terminated for refusing to submit to the
investigatory interview without representation,122 but under the DuPont precedent,
Borgs had no statutory right to refuse to attend the meeting. Thus, the ALJ
determined that Epilepsy’s discharge of Borgs did not violate § 8(a)(1) of the Act.123
When the matter came before the Board, it recognized that the ALJ was correct in
applying the ruling of DuPont as the current precedent, but it went on to overrule
that precedent and return to the construction of § 7 that extended the Weingarten
right to the nonunion setting.124 The Epilepsy Board’s departure from the twelveyear precedent was grounded on the belief that DuPont was inconsistent with the
rationale articulated in the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision and with the
purposes of the Act.125
The Board’s analysis began with two statements made by the Court in
Weingarten: (1) a union employee’s request for representation falls within the literal
wording of § 7 of the Act and (2) a union representative safeguards the interests of
the entire bargaining unit.126 The Board read the statements together and concluded
that they show how the Weingarten right is grounded in the rationale that “the Act
generally affords employees the opportunity to act together to address the issue of an
employer’s practice of imposing unjust punishment on employees.”127 This
conclusion marked the end of the Board’s discussion of the Weingarten decision and
it moved on to a discussion of the post-Weingarten Board decisions.
After a brief history of the bottom-line conclusions that the Board had made in
Materials Research, Sears, and DuPont, the Board expressed disapproval of the
latter two decisions which had refused to extend Weingarten to the nonunion
setting.128 The Epilepsy Board’s disagreement was based on its belief that refusing to
extend Weingarten misconstrued the language of the Court’s decision and

management and (3) a resistance to accepting responsibility for attempting to attain articulated
performance goals. Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *6 n.6.
However, the employer contended that it terminated Borgs for no other reason than his refusal
to submit to the interview. Id. at *7 n.7.
121

An 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice charge alleges that the employer “interfere[d] with,
restrain[ed], or coerce[d] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
122

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *7.

123

Id. at *7.

124

Id. at *12-13.

125

Id. at *7. Although DuPont was the standing precedent that the majority overruled, the
majority made no mistake about the fact that it equally disagreed with the Sears, Roebuck
decision. Id. at *12.
126

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *8 (citing 420 U.S.
251, 260 (1975)).
127

Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added).

128

Id. at *12.
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erroneously limited its applicability to the unionized workplace.129 Rather than
elaborating on how those decisions allegedly misconstrued the language of
Weingarten, the Board discussed why it agreed with the contrasting interpretation of
Weingarten that allows for the extension of Weingarten rights to the nonunion
setting.130 Specifically, the Board agreed with the emphasis that the majority in
Materials Research had attached to the belief that the Weingarten right was
grounded in the language of § 7 of the Act.
Beginning with the premises that (1) the right to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of mutual aid or protection is equally applicable in the nonunion
setting131 and that (2) the right to have a coworker present at an investigatory
interview greatly enhances the opportunities of nonunion employees to act in concert
to address their concern over unjust punishment by the employer,132 the Epilepsy
Board concluded that affording Weingarten rights to employees in nonunion settings
effectuates the policy that § 7 rights are not contingent on union representation.133
The Epilepsy Board then rejected arguments that had been raised in opposition to
extending Weingarten.134 The Board began with the argument that extending
Weingarten to nonunion settings “wrecks havoc” with provisions of the Act by
extinguishing a nonunion employer’s right to deal with its employees individually.135
In refuting this argument, the Epilepsy Board claimed that although a nonunion
employer may generally be free to deal with employees on an individual basis, that
right cannot be used to mask an obstruction of § 7 rights belonging to the
employees.136 A second argument that the Epilepsy Board refuted asserted that a
nonunion, co-worker representative would not have the same skills and abilities as a
union representative. The Epilepsy Board argued that the distinction was not enough
to justify limiting the Weingarten right to the union setting because not only does the
distinction itself rest on speculation as to the skills of a co-worker representative,137
but also because § 7 rights are not contingent on the skills or motives of the
representative in the first place.138
The Board also rejected the argument that extending Weingarten to the nonunion
setting conflicts with the system of exclusive representation established by the Act in
the sense that it forces a nonunion employer to “deal with” the equivalent of a labor
organization.139 Conceding, arguendo, that (1) a coworker representative could be
129

Id.

130

Id. at *12.

131

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *12-13.

132

Id. at *12-13.

133

Id. at *13.

134

Id. at *14.

135

Id.

136

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *14.

137

Id. at *18.

138

Id.

139

Id. at *16.
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characterized as “the equivalent of a labor organization” and (2) the employer is
forced to “deal with” the representative during the meeting,140 the Board concluded
that the employer is not being forced to “bargain with” the representative.141
Furthermore, the Board argued that, because the system of exclusive representation
is one of collective bargaining, and not of dealing, the role of the representative
cannot be in derogation of the exclusivity principle.142
The Epilepsy Board ended its opinion by rejecting two further arguments against
the extension of Weingarten: (1) extending Weingarten to nonunion settings may
actually work to the detriment of the nonunion employees because employers would
be encouraged to simply cancel investigatory interviews143 and (2) extending
Weingarten may place an “unknown trip wire” on nonunion employers who are
legitimately trying to investigate employee conduct because they will be unaware
that their employees have a Weingarten right.144 The Epilepsy Board found the first
argument to be based on a speculation that “assumes the worst in employer
motives,”145 while it found the second argument to erroneously rest on the belief that
ignorance of employee rights can provide a justification for denying those rights.146
Member Hurtgen wrote a fairly brief dissenting opinion, in which he stated that
not only was the majority’s decision an “abrupt” reversal of precedent, but it also
went against the compelling considerations set forth in DuPont as to why the
Weingarten right should not be extended to the nonunion setting.147 After first
conceding that § 7 would provide a nonunion employee with a right to seek the
assistance of a co-worker at an investigatory interview,148 Hurtgen assumed,
arguendo, that a nonunion employer could not fire an employee simply for asking to
have a co-worker present during an investigatory interview.149 However, he argued
that the nonunion employee would not have a right to insist on representation and
that an employer would not violate the Act if it required an employee to attend the
interview alone.150

140

Id. at *16-17.

141

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *17.

142

Id. at *16 (The majority made another point regarding the “exclusivity argument.” The
majority noted that if one finds a violation of the Act when an employer is forced to deal with
the equivalent of a labor organization, it must also find a violation of the Act when an
employer voluntarily deals with the equivalent of a labor organization. The majority found this
logic to be strained, but more importantly, irrelevant because the employer is not forced to
deal with the representative since the employer can always cancel the interview.).
143

Id. at *19.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *19-20.

147

Id. at *37-38 (Hurtgen, dissenting).

148

Id. at *38 (Hurtgen, dissenting).

149

Id. at *38-39.

150

Id. at *39.
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Hurtgen’s argument that nonunion employees do not have a right to insist on
representation during investigatory interviews began with a discussion of how the
DuPont precedent that disallowed the extension of Weingarten was well-grounded in
the Supreme Court’s focus on the union representative’s role of safeguarding the
interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.151 He found that the Court’s
emphasis on the “bargaining unit” and the “union representative” clearly supported
the idea that the Court did not envision a Weingarten right in the nonunion setting
where there is no union representative and no bargaining unit.152
Hurtgen then claimed that central differences between the union and nonunion
setting should keep the Board from transplanting rights from the union setting to the
nonunion setting.153 These differences are: (1) the union employer acts at its peril
when he deals directly with an employee regarding an employment related matter,
while the nonunion employer is completely free to deal with individual employees as
he wishes and (2) in a union setting, the representative may actually help the
interview process because of his knowledge of the discipline provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement and the grievance-arbitration provisions, while there
is neither a collective bargaining agreement nor a grievance arbitration procedure in
the nonunion setting.154
Hurtgen then asserted that the Supreme Court struck a delicate balance between
labor and management interests in its Weingarten decision by looking at the
following factors:155 (1) the union representative’s interest in representing all of the
unit employees; (2) the expertise and special knowledge of the union representative,
and (3) the industrial practice of many collective-bargaining agreements containing
“Weingarten-like” provisions.156 Hurtgen concluded that the Epilepsy Board’s
decision altered the balance struck by the Court because none of these factors are
present on the nonunion setting.157
Finally, as noted earlier, Hurtgen argued that the majority’s decision placed an
unknown trip wire on nonunion employers because many or most nonunion
employers would not be aware of the Weingarten right.158
Member Brame, the Epilepsy Board’s other Republican appointee, took a
stronger dissenting position than Hurtgen when he claimed that the Act compelled
the conclusion that Weingarten rights do not extend to nonunion employees.159

151
Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *39 (Hurtgen,
dissenting).
152

Id. at *39-40 (Hurtgen, dissenting).

153

Id. at *40.

154

Hurtgen qualified this latter distinction by noting that he was not characterizing
nonunion representatives as unintelligent, he was simply noting that they would not offer the
same insights as a union representative.
155

Id. at *41-42.

156

Id. at *42.

157

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *42.

158

Id. at *42-43.

159

Id. at *95.
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Echoing Van de Water’s dissent in Materials Research,160 Brame found that
extending Weingarten forces a nonunionized employer to deal with an employee
representative without that representative having achieved recognitional status.161
Brame found this situation to conflict with the general rule that in the absence of
recognitional status, a nonunion employer is free to deal with the employees on an
individual basis with regard to all terms and conditions of employment.162
Continuing the argument of Van de Water, Brame contended that requiring the
employer to recognize a representative in only one setting (i.e. disciplinary
interviews) that affects terms and condition of employment is “completely at odds
with the intent and structure of the Act.”163
After arguing that the Act compels a conclusion that Weingarten does not extend
to the nonunion setting, Brame argued that, at the very least, such a conclusion is the
best approach as a discretionary matter.164 In response to the majority’s argument
that it is “wholly speculative” to claim that nonunion employees are less qualified
than a union representative for the role of a Weingarten representative, Brame
claimed that it is wholly speculative to assume that a lone individual, selected on the
spur of the moment, would indeed advance the interests of all the employees and be
helpful throughout the interview.165
Brame also argued that a “practical reason” for not extending Weingarten to the
nonunion setting is that the co-worker representative would not have the same
incentive as a union representative to look out for the wider interests of the rest of
the workforce.166

160

Id. at *95. In other words, § 7 cannot be interpreted to allow unrepresented employees
the right to representation in one isolated context.
161

Id.

162

Id. It should be noted that the majority did address this particular argument made by
Brame. However, the majority seemed to mischaracterize the argument. The majority
claimed that Member Brame was arguing that an extension of Weingarten to the nonunion
setting forced an employer to “deal with” the equivalent of a labor organization and that this
conflicted with the exclusivity principle of § 9(a) of the Act. Brame’s reference to § 9
appeared in a footnote that he used to support his contention that a nonunionized employer is
under no duty to recognize an employee representative until that representative is certified.
The footnote stated that under § 9(a) of the Act, an employer is obligated to bargain with
representatives of employees, as opposed to the individual employees, once those
representatives have been certified. Thus, it seems to be a mischaracterization to state that
Brame found extension of Weingarten to conflict with the exclusivity principle. It seems that
Brame contended that extending Weingarten conflicts with the employer’s right to deal
individually with employees up to the point that a union is recognized because it is only once a
union is recognized that the exclusivity principle, which requires an employer to deal with
representatives, is triggered.
163

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *95.

164

Id. at *99.

165

Id. at *99-100.

166

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *101 (Brame,
dissenting).
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Again attacking the majority for labeling such a fear as speculative, Brame
claimed that the mere likelihood that a co-worker would indeed act with the interests
of all employees at hand does not overcome the fact that the interests of all are much
more likely to be safeguarded in the unionized setting.167 As a final blow to the
majority’s discounting the DuPont fears as speculative, Brame asserted that such a
characterization flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision168
because the Court in Weingarten found both the expertise of the union representative
and his duty to protect the interests of all employees to be important in balancing the
interests of labor and management.
V. THE EXTENSION OF WEINGARTEN TO THE NONUNION SETTING FAILS TO SATISFY
SECTION 7 IN TWO RESPECTS
Part V traced the conflicting Board decisions that have tackled the issue of
whether Weingarten should be extended to the nonunion setting. This section will
first look at whether the debate over extending Weingarten turns on § 7 or § 9. After
concluding that Weingarten rights are grounded in § 7, the analysis will turn to
whether exercising Weingarten rights in the nonunion setting satisfies the elements
of § 7.
Some of the conflict amongst the post-Weingarten Board decisions rests on
disagreement over the threshold issue of whether the Weingarten right is grounded in
§ 7 or § 9 of the NLRA. Van de Water, in his dissenting opinion in Materials
Research, first raised the argument that the Weingarten right was grounded in § 9 of
the NLRA. The bottom line of Van de Water’s argument is that: (1) § 9(a)
establishes the union as the exclusive representative of the employees; (2) §§ 8(a)(1)
and (a)(5) prohibit employer interference with the employees’ right to bargain
through that exclusive representative; and (3) an investigatory interview is a setting
in which a union employee has a right to be represented by his union representative.
If Van de Water is correct, there is no hope of extending Weingarten to the nonunion
setting that lacks an exclusive representative.
However, Van de Water’s perspective is not consistent with the Supreme Court’s
language that clearly shows that it protected a union employee’s right to
representation during investigatory interviews under § 7 and not § 9: “The action of
an employee seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a
confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7.”169
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that a Weingarten representative does not act
in a collective bargaining capacity170 and § 9 only designates the union as the
exclusive representative “for purposes of collective bargaining.” Thus, § 9 is
irrelevant to the Weingarten scenario.
Because the Court protected the Weingarten right under § 7, as opposed to § 9,
the only way to justify extending the right to the nonunion setting is to show that § 7
167

Id. at *101 (Brame, dissenting).

168

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *101 (Brame,
dissenting).
169

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260.

170

“The employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be
permitted to attend the investigatory interview.” J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260.
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protection would be equally applicable there despite the lack of a union. The clearest
way of analyzing whether an action is protected under § 7 is to tease out the statute’s
elements—concertedness, mutuality, and means—and determine whether each
element is individually satisfied.171 The Court’s Weingarten decision focused on the
first two elements, which come directly out of the statutory language.172 The means
element, which has been read into the statute, is irrelevant to this discussion because
there is no argument that requesting representation is an impermissible form of
employee activity.
A. Concertedness
The phrase “concerted activities” has a very broad meaning for purposes of § 7
because of the Court’s determination that “the language of § 7 does not confine itself
to such a narrow meaning that it applies only to a situation in which two or more
employees are working together at the same time and same place toward a common
goal.”173 This broad interpretation has created two categories under which concerted
activity may fall: (1) “classic concerted” activity in which two or more employees
act together and (2) “deemed concerted” activity in which the actions of an
individual employee are so closely linked to those of other employees that they can
be recognized as concerted. The Weingarten scenario is a type of deemed concerted
activity because it involves only one employee asserting a right (i.e. only the
employee being investigated requests the presence of a representative).174
Given the Supreme Court’s N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., Inc. (hereinafter City
Disposal) opinion, which established § 7 protection for a single employee’s actions
that grow out of a collective bargaining agreement, it seems indisputable that there is
concerted activity in one union employee’s request for union representation during
an investigatory meeting. However, the following analysis will set forth a two-point
argument as to why a nonunion employee’s request for representation during an
investigatory interview is not concerted activity. First, the logic of City Disposal
fails in the nonunion setting. Second, the rationale that the single employee’s request
for representation protects the interest of all employees also fails in the nonunion
setting.
In City Disposal, a union employee relied on a collective bargaining provision
when he refused to drive a malfunctioning truck.175 The Court found the employee’s
171

This analytical scheme was endorsed by Charles J. Morris. See supra note 7. Although
these three elements should be viewed as separate and independent of each other, the
justifications for finding each element in a particular action will often overlap.
172
The requirement of reasonable means has been read into the statute so as to prevent
illegal or disloyal behavior from being protected under section 7 simply because it is concerted
and for mutual aid or protection. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
173

N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).

174

The fact that the right being asserted requests the presence of another does not place this
scenario in the category of classic concerted activity because it remains that there is only one
employee asserting the right.
175

The collective bargaining agreement provision relied on stated: “The Employer shall
not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe
operating condition or equipped with the safety appliance prescribed by law.” 465 U.S. at
824-25.
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refusal to drive the truck to be concerted activity because “the invocation of a right
rooted in a collective-bargaining agreement is unquestionably an integral part of the
[collective] process that gave rise to the agreement.”176 “A lone employee’s
invocation of a right grounded in his collective-bargaining agreement is…a
concerted activity in a very real sense.”177
Likewise, when, as in Weingarten, a single union employee seeks the assistance
of his union steward during an investigatory interview, he is extending the collective
activity that voted in the union and negotiated the collective-bargaining agreement.178
It should be noted that City Disposal spoke specifically to the narrow situation of a
lone employee asserting an explicit right contained in the collective bargaining
agreement.179 The Weingarten scenario is one step removed from City Disposal
because it involves the invocation of the aid of a union steward rather than the
invocation of a particular right listed in the collective bargaining agreement.180
Nevertheless, the bottom line of City Disposal was that the action of the individual
was closely enough related to the prior collective bargaining activity such that
neither would have been complete without the other.181 Surely, the voting in of a
union would be incomplete without the employees being able to invoke its help and
the request for a union steward would be impossible without first voting in a union.
Accordingly, the action of the employee requesting the help of the union
representative is closely enough linked to the actions of other employees that it is
deemed to be concerted activity.
City Disposal represents the strongest argument in favor of finding concertedness
in the exercise of the Weingarten right in the union setting. However, this argument
has no applicability in the nonunion setting where there is no concerted activity
leading to either a union or collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, it is impossible
for a single nonunion employee’s request for the presence of a fellow employee
during an investigatory interview to be an outgrowth of any concerted activity.
Therefore, if a nonunion employee’s exercise of the Weingarten right is going to be
protected by § 7, the invocation of the right itself will have to be concerted, without
reference to any prior concerted activities.
The Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision did not apply the logic of City
Disposal to its analysis of the concerted nature of a union employee’s request for
representation because Weingarten was decided years before City Disposal. Rather,
the Court emphasized the fact that the union representative safeguarded the interests
of all the employees in addition to the individual employee being interviewed.182
176

Id. at 831.

177

Id. at 832.

178

Id. at. 822 (1984).

179

City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. at 827. It should be noted that although the right
asserted by the employee in City Disposal was contained in the collective bargaining
agreement, the employee, when asserting that right, did not refer to the specific provision of
the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
180

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 254.

181

City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. at 833.

182

Although the statutory duty to provide fair representation (§301) is only triggered in
collective bargaining situations the union always has the threat of being voted out to keep it in
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This can lead to a finding of concertedness under the theory that the individual
employee asserting the Weingarten right in the union setting can be viewed as
initiating a process that will benefit all employees due to the role of the union
representative.183 Furthermore, the outcome of the interview will indeed affect all
the employees because almost all collective bargaining agreements have a “just
cause” provision that prohibits the employer from imposing discipline without just
cause and if an employer arbitrarily disciplines the employees, he will be deemed to
be acting without just cause. Thus, when the union representative, acting with the
interests of all, helps to reach a pro-employee result, the process benefits all the
employees.
The Supreme Court’s rationale of finding concertedness in the exercise of the
Weingarten right in the union setting cannot be applied in the nonunion setting
because although the nonunion Weingarten representative may represent the interests
of all employees, there is no guarantee that he will do so. More importantly, even if
the representative acts for the interests of all, it will be inconsequential because the
outcome of the meeting will not affect the other employees given that nonunion
employers are free to act arbitrarily in disciplining employees due to the lack of a
collective bargaining agreement with a just cause provision. With the outcome of
the meeting having no bearing on the other employees (not necessarily, anyway), it
cannot be said that the employee asserting the Weingarten right in the nonunion
setting is initiating a process that will necessarily benefit the employees generally.
For example, assume that the nonunion representative is asked to assist an
employee who is being investigated for an infraction that the representative knows is
also being committed by several other employees.184 Assume further that the
representative is competent and not emotionally involved in the matter. The
representative then does his best to urge the employer to impose a light punishment
since he knows that several other employees will probably be brought up on the
same charge and he is looking out for all of them. Under this hypothetical, the
nonunion representative has indeed considered the interests of all employees, but it
may very well become inconsequential for the next employee who is brought up on
the same charge. The employer may have imposed the light punishment on the first
employee because he did not realize how many employees were committing this
infraction or he may have favored that employee for some reason. Regardless of his
motivation, the employer is free to impose much harsher punishments on the
subsequent employees. Thus, when all is said and done, even though the nonunion
representative may act with the interests of all employees at hand, this possibility is
no assurance that the Weingarten interview will be a process that benefits all, as it is
in the union setting.
check. Thus, despite the Court making it clear that the Weingarten scenario is not one of
collective bargaining, the Weingarten representative would still have a duty of fair
representation hanging over him because if the employees feel that the union is not adequately
representing them, they can vote the union out.
183
Morris, supra note 7, at 1703. “A presumption [with regard to concertedness] should
arise . . . if the single employee’s activity initiates a process that is intended to benefit [all]
employees generally.” Id.
184
This surely is an assumption because there is no guarantee that a co-worker, as opposed
to a union representative will know about all the things going on with regard to all the
employees.
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In the end, City Disposal’s persuasive argument for why the assertion of the
Weingarten right in the union setting is concerted has absolutely no bearing on
protecting the same right in the nonunion setting because that argument is contingent
on the presence of a duly elected union. Additionally, the rationale that exercising
the Weingarten right in the union setting is concerted because it protects the interests
of all employees is not found in the nonunion setting where there is no guarantee that
the presence of a representative will benefit all employees.
Moving on to the second facet of § 7 protected activity, it must be analyzed
whether exercising the Weingarten right in the nonunion setting aids or protects
other employees. This discussion will set forth an argument as to why the Supreme
Court’s rationale for finding mutual aid or protection when Weingarten rights are
exercised in the union setting cannot be transferred to the nonunion setting.
The Supreme Court justified protecting, under § 7, the exercise of the right to
representation at investigatory meetings in the union setting because it assured other
employees that they also can have representation if they are called into an
investigatory interview.185
This assurance grows out of the duty of fair
representation that binds unions. Under this doctrine, “the exclusive agent’s
statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory
obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct.”186 Thus, once one union employee is provided with
representative during an investigatory interview, all the other employees are assured
of the same benefit if they request it.
This notion of assurance cannot be transplanted to the nonunion setting, where
nonunion employees have absolutely no obligation to represent each other, explicitly
or implicitly. Furthermore, nonunion employees do not even have much of an
incentive to represent each other because they have nothing to lose by refusing to do
so. Any incentive to serve as a Weingarten representative would seemingly be based
on the popularity of the individual invoking the right or the popularity of the
underlying reason for which the meeting was called (i.e. is the employee seeking a
representative one who other employees would want to help and/or is the matter for
which the employee is being investigated one of interest to the other employees).
Beyond a nonunion employee having little incentive to serve as a Weingarten
representative, he may have something to lose if his serving as a Weingarten
representative would irritate the employer. The bottom line is that without an
overarching obligation, the fact that one employee had a Weingarten representative
provides no comfort to the other employees.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier,187 because of the just cause provisions in
collective bargaining agreements, the outcome of an investigatory meeting in the
union setting affects all employees of the employer. Under this scheme, the
individual employee’s action of asserting his Weingarten right benefits the interests
of other employees because the outcome of the meeting will establish precedent and
the other employee’s would want a union representative present to hopefully shape
that precedent.
185

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260.

186

Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct. 903, 910 (1967).

187

See supra page 44.
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In contrast, in the nonunion setting, as explained in the discussion of
concertedness, not only does the co-worker representative have no obligation to
protect the interests of the other employees, but the outcome of the meeting will not
even affect the other employees because the employer can act in an arbitrary manner.
The employer could discipline another employee in a totally different manner for the
same offense due to the lack of a just cause requirement such that the later employee,
in a similar situation as the first, finds no comfort in how the employer handled the
first. Rather than there being a close relationship between the individual employee
exercising the Weingarten right and the interests of the other employees, there is a
complete disconnect.
In the end, exercising the Weingarten right in the nonunion setting fails to
constitute activity carried out for the mutual aid or protection of others. The
Supreme Court’s rationale for finding mutual aid or protection in Weingarten is
inapplicable in the nonunion setting where the fact that one nonunion employee was
able to have a co-worker present at an investigatory meeting provides no assurance
to other nonunion employees that they could have the same. Furthermore, the
rationale that all benefits attained by a union representative for one employee in an
investigatory interview extend to the other employees via the “just cause provision”
in the collective bargaining agreement is inapplicable in the nonunion setting.
Nonunion employees do not reap the benefits that a co-worker representative might
achieve for an employee in an investigatory interview because the employer can
discipline in an arbitrary manner.
VI. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S UPHOLDING OF EPILEPSY
Just last November, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the
Board’s Epilepsy decision to extend Weingarten rights to the nonunion setting.188
The court’s opinion does not require much analysis, as it amounts to a Chevron
deference.189 Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
(hereinafter Chevron), if a statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, the agency that
administers the statute may resolve the issue, and deference must be given to such
resolution so long as it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the statute.190 Under
Chevron, the duty to give deference is only triggered if the statute itself is not clear
on the issue decided by the agency.191 Thus, because the D.C. Circuit jumped right
into analyzing whether the Epilepsy Board’s decision was reasonable under the Act,
it must have assumed that the language of § 7 is not clear as to whether Weingarten
rights can be extended to the nonunion setting. However, the D.C. Circuit did not set
forth an analysis of § 7 itself.
The D.C. Circuit found reasonable the Board’s conclusion that: (1) the presence
of a nonunion co-worker in an investigatory interview is concerted and for mutual
aid or protection192 and (2) the extension of Weingarten to the nonunion setting is not
188

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 268 F.3d at 1095.

189

The term “Chevron deference” comes from the U.S. Supreme Court case, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
190

467 U.S. at 842-43.

191

Id.

192

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 268 F.3d at 1099.
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at odds with § 9 of the NLRA.193 The court briefly set forth two points in support of
its determination that it was reasonable for the Board to find concertedness and
mutuality in the exercise of Weingarten rights in the nonunion setting: (1) the
Board’s position recognized that nonunion employees, as well as union employees,
have a shared interest in preventing unjust punishment and the presence of a coworker in an investigatory interview will help prevent unjust punishment194 and (2) it
is within the province of the Board and not the courts to determine if a Weingartentype rule is appropriate in the nonunion setting in light of changing industrial
practices.195
In support of its determination that it was reasonable for the Board to find that
extending Weingarten to the nonunion setting does not conflict with § 9 of the
NLRA, the D.C. Circuit simply reiterated the Board’s answer to the issue.196 The
D.C. Circuit agreed with the Board’s conclusion that there is no conflict because
§ 9’s system of exclusive representation is one of collective bargaining, not one of
dealing, and the employer is under no duty to bargain with the Weingarten
representative.197
There was one issue on which the D.C. Circuit did not defer to the Board’s
conclusion. The D.C. Circuit found that the Board erred in giving retroactive effect
to its new interpretation of §7.198 In declining to enforce the Board’s decision on
retroactivity, the D.C. Circuit noted that the governing principle is that “when there
is a substitution of new law for old law,” it can only be applied prospectively “in
order to protect the settled expectations of those who relied on the preexisting
rule.”199
Finally, the D.C. Circuit noted that the Board’s conclusion to extend Weingarten
to the nonunion setting obviously is debatable, but the rationale underlying the
conclusion is both clear and reasonable.200 Thus, the D.C. Circuit did not say that the
Board’s Epilepsy decision was compelled by the Act—it simply said that it is a
reasonable interpretation of the Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether nonunion employees have a statutorily protected right to
representation at an investigatory meeting has been ongoing for almost thirty years
and it will probably continue to be debated until the Board and appellate courts
193

Id. It should be noted that on appeal, the Epilepsy Foundation argued that the Board’s
decision violated nonunion employers’ First Amendment right to speak individually with his
or her employees. Id. The D.C. Circuit did not address this argument because it was not
raised with the Board. Id. at 1101.
194

Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 268 F.3d at 1100.
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Id.
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Id. at 1101.
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Id. at 1100-01 (quoting 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 428 at *16). See also Slaughter v.
NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 127 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio, 268 F.3d at 1102.
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Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. FERC, 91 F.3d 1478, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

200

Id. at 1102.
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undertake a focused analysis of whether § 7 allows such a right. The approach the
Board has adopted with regard to this issue has produced conflicting opinions
because the Board has rested its decisions on areas open to debate. Examples of
such areas include the practical repercussions of an extension, the tilt in the balance
between employees and employers, and the skill level of a union representative
compared to a nonunion representative. A focused analysis of the established
elements of § 7 would provide a more hard line outcome that would be upheld and
maintained with greater success. Nevertheless, as history indicates, the Board
decisions will often mimic the political party that composes the Board majority.201
Perhaps the best guess as to why the § 7 analysis is lacking is because such an
analysis would lead to the conclusion that exercising Weingarten rights in the
nonunion setting cannot be protected under § 7. In the absence of the union
steward’s broad purposes to look out for the interests of all employees and in the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement to link the action of the single
employee to group activity, there can be no showing of concertedness and mutuality.
Despite its failure to show the presence of the statutory requirements, the
Epilepsy Board overruled its twelve year precedent that confined the Weingarten
rights to the union setting where all of the elements of § 7 protection are found. The
Epilepsy Board’s decision is contrary to the Act—it is an impermissible reading of
§ 7—and thus, it is not entitled to deference under Chevron. However, the D.C.
Circuit, in similar fashion to the Board decisions following Weingarten, skipped over
a detailed analysis of § 7, and found the Board’s decision to be reasonable.
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit decision does not put the issue to rest because it did
not find that the extension was mandated by the Act, only that it was reasonable
under the Act. Thus, the new Republican Board202 could reverse the matter again.
A quote from one of the dissenting justices in Weingarten seems to be rather
appropriate to the subsequent history that followed the seminal case in this area of
labor law:
The tortured history and inconsistency of the Board’s efforts in this
difficult area suggest the need for an explanation by the Board of why the
new rule was adopted. However, a much more basic policy demands that
the Board explain its new construction.
The integrity of the
administrative process requires that “[when] the Board so exercises the
discretion given to it by Congress, it must disclose the basis of its order
and give indication that it has exercised the discretion with which
Congress has empowered it.”203
SARAH C. FLANNERY204
201

See Appendix.

202

The current Board includes three Republicans: Peter Hurtgen (former management
attorney); Michael Bartlett (former management attorney) and William Cowen (former
management attorney). All are recess appointees of President Bush. The fourth member is a
democrat, Wilma Liebman, an appointee of former President Clinton.
203

J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 269 (C.J., Burger, dissenting).

204
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APPENDIX1
Post- Weingarten Board Decisions2
Weingarten right should be extended to the
nonunion setting

Weingarten right should not be
extended to the nonunion setting

Materials Research, 262 NLRB 1010 (1982).
3-2 vote
Majority: Fanning (Eisenhower) (Dem.)
Jenkins (Kennedy) (Rep.)
Zimmerman (Carter) (Ind.)
Minority: Van de Water (Reagan) (Rep.)
Hunter (Reagan) (Rep.)
Sears, Roebuck., 274 NLRB 230
(1985).
3-0 vote
Dotson (Reagan) (Rep.)
Dennis (Reagan) (Dem.)
Hunter (Reagan) (Rep.)
E.I. DuPont, 289 NLRB 627
(1988)
4-0 vote
Stephens (Reagan) (Rep.)
Johansen (Reagan) (Rep.)
Babson (Reagan) (Dem.)
Cracraft (Reagan) (Dem.)
Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 NLRB LEXIS
428
3-2 vote
Majority: Truesdale (Clinton) (Dem.)
Fox (Clinton) (Dem.)
Liebman (Clinton) (Dem.)
Minority: Hurtgen (Clinton) (Dem.)
Brame (Clinton) (Dem.)

1

Data taken from Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation
of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000) (appendix); National Labor Relations
Board Members, at http://www.nlrb.gov/members.html (last visited April 28, 2002).
2

Key: Parens following Board Member’s name indicates the President who appointed the
Member and the Member’s political party affiliation.
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